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PANEL V: 
OWNERSHIP OF LIFE* 
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD FROM THE 
PERSPECTIVE OF FAMILY LAW 
CARL E. ScHNEIDER** 
One of the things that I find most puzzling about the ques-
tion of surrogate motherhood is how easily many people an-
swer it. One of the things that I have most admired about 
today's comments is their tone of constraint and their sense of 
complexity. 1 I myself am sympathetic to the argument that the 
unhappiness of infertile couples is profound and that surrogacy 
contracts offer them the hope of an equally profound happi-
ness. And I am prepared to believe that many surrogate 
mothers perform their part of the bargain without grief and 
even with gratification. 
Yet these benefits of surrogacy are only two of the dauntingly 
numerous elements of any calculation about whether surrogacy 
contracts ought to be legally permitted or legally enforced. To 
these benefits we may want to add, for example, the happiness 
of children who would not otherwise have been born and who 
have good homes and good parents. On the other hand, some 
surrogate mothers will become sick or even die because of the 
pregnancy. Some surrogate mothers will feel the sharpest kind 
of sorrow when they are compelled to give up their children or 
the sharpest kind of regret after they have willingly done so. 
The husbands of surrogate mothers will share those sorrows 
and feel some of their own. Children born of these contracts 
may feel some bitterness toward both their parents and even 
some confusion about who their parents are. A few children 
will be rejected by both parents. The siblings of children given 
up by surrogate mothers may fear for their own status in the 
• This panel was introduced by Patricia D. White, Professor of Law, University of 
Michigan. 
•• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. 
I. For other helpful work on surrogacy, see M. FIELD, SuRROGATE MoTHERHOOD: 
THE LEGAL AND HuMAN IssuEs (1988); Colloquy: In Re Baby M, 76 GEO. LJ. 1717 
(1988). For discussions of the related questions of a market for adoptive children, see 
Landes & Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL Snm. 323 (1978); Forum: 
Adoption and Market Theory, 67 B.U.L. REv. 59 (1987). 
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family. Surrogacy might inhibit the adoption of hard-to-place 
children. The social consequences of treating children as ob-
jects to be sold and women as a means of production may be 
disquieting. And even if these were all the elements of the 
calculus, we might still wonder how to perform the calculation. 
How many contracting parents will be m?de happy? How many 
surrogate mothers will be made miserable? How many units of 
parental happiness are needed to outweigh the units of misery 
of one surrogate mother who changes her mind? 
How, then, are we to make social policy in the face of this 
kind of uncertainty? In his article on the Baby M case, Professor 
Schuck is kind enough to say that "family law provides a rich 
source of norms, experience, and institutional guidance upon 
which the law can draw in attempting to predict behavior and 
regulate contracts dealing with surrogacy."2 Because I make 
my living by studying family law, it occurred to me that this 
afternoon I might most usefully try to sketch some lessons from 
that "rich source." In particular, I want to examine in the light 
of my understanding of family law's experience two arguments 
commonly advanced for enforcing surrogacy contracts: first, 
the argument drawing on our ideas about the desirability of 
contract as a principle of social organization; second, the argu-
ment that these contracts are constitutionally protected. I 
should warn you, however, that the goal of this examination 
will not be to prove a case for or against surrogacy. The goal 
will be the more modest one of providing a cautionary look at 
two of the standard defenses of surrogacy. 
I do not need to persuade this audience that the idea of con-
tract has had a powerful position in American law, and I proba-
bly do not need to tell it that proponents of surrogacy have 
invoked that position to justify surrogacy. But I do want to say 
that contract has never had that kind of prepotence in family 
law. Even though family law has recently become less chary of 
contracts, many substantial limitations on them still apply: 
Contracts to marry are basically unenforceable. Contracts that 
restrain someone from marrying are subject to a judicial rule of 
reason. Couples may not alter the "essential incidents" of the 
marriage relationship. Courts will generally not enforce con-
tracts regulating the non-economic aspects of marriage. Par-
2. Schuck, Some Reflections on the Baby M Case, 76 GEO. LJ. 1793, 1809 (1988). 
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ents are not unrestrainedly free to contract out their children's 
labor. Courts apply unusually strong tests of procedural and 
substantive conscionability in regulating even the economic as-
pects of marriage and of divorce. Courts may alter or ignore 
contracts allocating marital property, spousal support, child 
custody, and child support on divorce. Some jurisdictions will 
not enforce some kinds of contracts between unmarried cohab-
itants. No jurisdiction will enforce a contract for the sale of sex-
ual services. Most jurisdictions allow a parent who has 
consented to the adoption of a child to revoke that consent 
more readily than contract law would ordinarily allow. 
My point is notjust that family law has been skeptical of, or 
even hostile to, contract. It is that some of the reasons for that 
skepticism speak to some of our concerns about surrogacy con-
tracts. One reason, for example, is that the subject matter of 
family contracts-our relationship with the people closest to 
us-is both peculiarly important and peculiarly subject to emo-
tions that are hard to comprehend, predict, or control. A cen-
tral problem with surrogacy is precisely our fear that the 
surrogate mother will not correctly anticipate and will not be 
able to govern her feelings about someone closest to her-her 
child. 
Another reason for family law's skepticism of contracts is the 
fear that contracting parties are specially vulnerable when they 
are contracting about their most intimate personal relation-
ships and when they are contracting with people with whom 
they have intimate personal ties. People vulnerable in these 
ways may be particularly susceptible to manipulation by those 
they are contracting with and, even apart from this, may fail to 
assert their own interests adequately. Family law's concern here 
is thus not just that many family contracts may be unfair; it is 
also that many family contracts will be inefficient because the 
interests of both contracting parties will not have been accu-
rately and vigorously represented. 
It is not hard to see that these problems may present them-
selves in the negotiation of surrogacy contracts. If the advo-
cates of surrogacy are correct, many surrogates enter into these 
contracts because they want to do good in a specially intimate 
way. Mary Beth Whitehead says that she was so much influ-
enced by such a motive that she did not at first want to be paid. 
She suggests that the clinic that brokered her contract played 
128 Haroard journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 13 
deliberately, effectively, and destructively onjust those motives 
and emotions. 3 . 
A further rea~on for family law's skepticism of contract is that 
decent anq effective remedies are often hard to contrive. Some-
times you cannot compel the breaching party to remedy the 
breach without simultaneously injuring the party breached 
against or other innocent members of the family. Sometimes 
you cannot compel the breaching party to remedy the breach 
without intolerable harshness. As the Baby M case and the cases 
in which a defective child has been born and rejected by the 
father demonstrate,4 surrogacy contracts potentially present 
each of these dilemmas. To put it briefly, money damages will 
often be inadequate and even inappropriate, yet specific per-
formance will often be impractical and even cruel. 
Another reason for family law's skepticism of contracts is the 
sense that contract is an inappropriate way of thinking about 
family relations, a way that encourages people to behave badly 
toward each other. The argument is that people who think in 
contract terms about their family relationships are thinking 
selfishly when they should be thinking altruistically, are, not to 
coin a phrase, treating each other as means and not as ends. 
And at the heart of much of the objection to surrogacy is pre-
cisely this sense that it reduces people to commodities and rela-
tions to commerce. 
In this brief survey, I have found reasons in the experience of 
family law with contract for caution in deciding whether to en-
force surrogacy contracts. I wish now to look at what family law 
may teach us about the argument that surrogacy contracts are 
constitutionally inviolable. I have no doubt that such an argu-
ment can be constructed. But I think that the experience of 
family law suggests that any such argument will be both consti-
tutionally defective and socially inadequate. 
In cases from Meyer 5 and Pierce 6 to Griswold 7 and Roe,8 the 
Supreme Court has built what it calls the doctrine of privacy. 
That this doctrine is unfounded in any constitutional text or in 
3. See M.B. WHITEHEAD, A MoTHER's STORY: THE TRUTH Anotrr THE BABY M CAsE 
(1989). 
4. See Areen, Baby M Reconsidered, 76 GEo. LJ. 1741, 1747 (1988). 
5. Meyer v. State of Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
6. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
7. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
8. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. II3 (1973). 
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the contemplation of any Framers and that the "right to be let 
alone" is an inherently expansive right have together contrib-
uted to the fact that the privacy doctrine proves too much, that 
it potentially invalidates too much law that is too obviously nec-
essary. If the privacy right is to be plausible and useful in inter-
preting the Constitution or in making social policy, it must be 
defined and thereby limited. The Court, however, has sedu-
lously avoided that responsibility. Instead of defining the right, 
the Court has developed it in a frankly analogic and quite mys-
tifying way. That is why I am confident that a constitutional 
right to enter into and even to enforce surrogacy contracts can 
be constructed-indeed, virtually every governmental regula-
tion in family law has been condemned as violating the right of 
privacy by one commentator or another. 
The experience of family law suggests, then, that the right to 
privacy is so loosely constructed, so vaguely limited, and so ca-
paciously broad that it has become internally contradictory and 
analytically meaningless. For instance, the Court mechanically 
conceptualizes the right of privacy in the traditional terms of 
the Mill ppradigm, in which a single right-holder confronts the 
power of the state. But family-law situations commonly involve 
two right-holders whose interests conflict. Our ordinary prefer-
ence for the right-holder against the state then collapses be-
cause there are conflicting rights.9 Thus, where the question is 
whether a surrogacy contract can be enforced against an un-
willing mother by an importunate father, the doctrine of pri-
vacy can tell us little more than that both the father and the 
mother have strong, similar, and irreconcilable interests. 
One way of delimiting, and thus making more useful and 
plausible, the privacy right would be to allow the right to be 
circumscribed by state interests. However, the Court has estab-
lished, in practice if not in preachment, that any such state in-
terest must be almost impossibly strong and that the statute 
must be almost impossibly essential to the interest. (When the 
Court has wished to sustain a statute, it has, as in Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 10 simply, if confusingly, manipulated the definition of 
the privacy right.) What this has ·meant is that state interests 
that are important but whose operations are complex and indi-
9. See Schneider, Rights Discourse and Neonatal Euthanasia,. 76 CALIF. L. REv. 151 
(1988). 
10. 478 u.s. 186 (1986). 
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rect have been excluded from constitutional and social 
policymaking. 11 
Much of family law tries to prevent harmful behavior by di-
rectly prohibiting the behavior, as when it criminalizes child 
abuse. But at the core of family law lies the enforcement prob-
lem: Much harmful behavior in families is impervious to direct 
prohibition. In response to this enforcement problem, family 
law has adopted two indirect techniques. 
The first of thes~ indirect techniques is the channelling func-
tion. Family law attempts to establish those social institutions 
that seem most likely to lead to human happiness. A classic ex-
ample is monogamous marriage. The law's assumption is that 
while some people might well live happily in a polygamous 
marriage, many plural spouses and many of their children will 
find such marriages distinctly more difficult than they would 
find monogamous marriages. The law thus bans polygamy to 
channel people into monogamy. It seems to me that the 
number of things that can go wrong with surrogacy contracts is 
great enough that there is an argument to be made that, de-
spite their potential advantages to some people, the law should 
channel people away from the institution of surrogacy. 12 
Family law's second technique for doing indirectly what it 
cannot do directly is its expressive function. The law, by its 
choice of rules, ideas, and language, seeks to encourage people 
to think about their relationships in ways that conduce to 
human happiness. Of course, many opponents of surrogacy re-
fer to this function when they argue that surrogacy turns chil-
dren into commodities. But the expressive function is relevant 
to surrogacy in another way. Family law is anxious to en-
courage in parents a strong-indeed, an automatic and even 
unreasoning-devotion to their children. Family law thus seeks 
to make it unthinkable, to make it taboo, for parents to aban-
don their children. (Adoption, on this view, is a necessary evil, 
and it is carefully hedged around with reminders that the 
mother is yielding her child for adoption only under the pres-
II. See Schneider, State-Interest Analysis in Fourteenth Amendment "Privacy" Law: An Essay 
on the Constitutionalization of Social Issues, 51 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 79 (1988). 
12. The channelling function can work in a variety of ways; channelling people away 
from surrogacy would not need to mean prohibiting surrogacy. For example, surrogacy 
contracts could be made unenforceable but not illegal, they could be made enforceable 
by the mother but not by the father, they could be burdened with particularly strong 
procedural requirements, and so forth. 
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sure of exigent circumstances, only in the child's interests, and 
only at painful cost to herself.) Part of what is troubling about 
surrogacy is that it is one of a number of developments that 
seem likely to weaken the sense of automatic and ineradicable 
commitment between family members. Indeed, surrogacy 
might seem to make detaching yourself from your child a 
virtue. 
This quick survey of the channelling and the expressive func-
tions of family law seems to me to suggest that both functions 
speak in important ways to the surrogacy_ problem. However, 
the analytic structure the Court now uses to evaluate privacy 
claims makes no room for such arguments because they do not 
fit neatly into the structure's "necessary to serve a compelling 
state interest" formula. In sum, the experience of family law 
with the privacy right is, once again, cautionary. It intimates 
that the Court has devised a doctrine so poorly defined that the 
doctrine's legitimacy is put into doubt, that the personal inter-
ests that it presumably protects cannot be intelligently under-
stood, and that the state policies it confronts cannot be 
satisfactorily considered. It suggests, then, that the case for sur-
rogacy is more persuasively defended in other terms. 
I have not exhausted my subject. But I have exhausted my 
time, and I fear, your patience. So let me close by hoping that 
this view of family law's perspective on surrogacy convinces 
you that none of us has yet spoken the last word on the 
question. 
